行为公司金融：综述（英文版）(pdf 63页)

行为公司金融：综述（英文版）目录：
challenges....39
C. Investment policy ....40
C.1. Real investment ....40
C.2. Mergers and acquisitions...42
D. Financial policy .43
D.1. Capital structure....43
D.2. Financial contracting...44
E. Other behavioral patterns.....44
E.1. Bounded rationality.....45
E.2. Reference-point preferences....46
IV. Conclusion.48
References .....51

 

行为公司金融：综述（英文版）内容提要：
    Corporate finance aims to explain the financial contracts and the real investment behaviorthat emerge from the interaction of managers and investors. Thus, a complete explanation offinancing and investment patterns requires an understanding of the beliefs and preferences ofthese two sets of agents. The majority of research in corporate finance assumes a broadrationality. Agents are supposed to develop unbiased forecasts about future events and use theseto make decisions that best serve their own interests. As a practical matter, this means thatmanagers can take for granted that capital markets are efficient, with prices rationally reflecting
public information about fundamental values. Likewise, investors can take for granted thatmanagers will act in their self-interest, rationally responding to incentives shaped bycompensation contracts, the market for corporate control, and other governance mechanisms.This paper surveys research in behavioral corporate finance.
     This research replaces thetraditional rationality assumptions with potentially more realistic behavioral assumptions. Theliterature is divided into two general approaches, and we organize the survey around them.Roughly speaking, the first approach emphasizes the effect of investor behavior that is less thanfully rational, and the second considers managerial behavior that is less than fully rational. Foreach line of research, we review the basic theoretical frameworks, the main empirical challenges,and the empirical evidence. Of course, in practice, both channels of irrationality may operate atthe same time; our taxonomy is meant to fit the existing literature, but it does suggest somestructure for how one might, in the future, go about combining the two approaches.
      The “irrational investors approach” assumes that securities market arbitrage is imperfect,and thus that prices can be too high or too low. Rational managers are assumed to perceivemispricings, and to make decisions that may encourage or respond to mispricing. While theirdecisions may maximize the short-run value of the firm, they may also result in lower long-runvalues as prices correct. In the simple theoretical framework we outline, managers balance threeobjectives: fundamental value, catering, and market timing. Maximizing fundamental value hasthe usual ingredients. Catering refers to any actions intended to boost share prices above
fundamental value. Market timing refers specifically to financing decisions intended to capitalizeon temporary mispricings, generally via the issuance of overvalued securities and the repurchaseof undervalued ones.

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