工商管理核心课程-会计学.ppt41

corporate governance and accounting
Accounting and Economics share some common  basic assumptions :
    First level: scarcity of resources, complexity and uncertainty of environment, economic men with bounded rationality
    Second level: information incompleteness and asymmetry, opportunistic behavior tendency (different utility functions, externality of behavior),  positive  transaction cost
    Result: incomplete contracts
    The Nature of the Firm: Jensen & Meckling(1976) the nexus of a set of contracts between owners of production factors, a legal fiction

corporate governance and accounting
The Ownership of the Firm:     residual control rights
                                                  claim to firm’s residue
    Agency problem:
  1.principal (information disadvantage) and agent (information advantage) :observability of agent’s action, risk preference
  2.adverse selection and moral hazard
    ex ante information asymmetry      ex ante opportunistic behavior
    ex post information asymmetry      ex post opportunistic behavior
                   ex ante i.e. pre-contract,  ex post i.e. post-contract
 *ex ante opportunistic behavior i.e. adverse selection :screening, signalling, how to induce candidates tell the truth,cost of signal is so high that others can not to reproduce
  *ex post opportunistic behavior i.e. moral hazard :
        ---monitor:social, law, market( market for corporate control,managerial labor market, competitive product and service market,creditors monitor,large shareholders etc.)
       ---incentive: pecuniary incentive(salary,bonus, restricted stock,stock option, stock appreciation right , phantom stock , long-term performance plan  etc.);  non-pecuniary incentive(control,reputation,self-satisfaction etc.)
            

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