行为公司金融综述(英文版)(pdf 63页)

I. Introduction
II. The irrational investors approach
III. The irrational managers approach
IV. Conclusion

 

     Corporate finance aims to explain the financial contracts and the real investment behavior that emerge from the interaction of managers and investors. Thus, a complete explanation of financing and investment patterns requires an understanding of the beliefs and preferences of these two sets of agents. The majority of research in corporate finance assumes a broad rationality. Agents are supposed to develop unbiased forecasts about future events and use these to make decisions that best serve their own interests. As a practical matter, this means that managers can take for granted that capital markets are efficient, with prices rationally reflecting public information about fundamental values. Likewise, investors can take for granted that managers will act in their self-interest, rationally responding to incentives shaped by compensation contracts, the market for corporate control, and other governance mechanisms.
     This paper surveys research in behavioral corporate finance. This research replaces the traditional rationality assumptions with potentially more realistic behavioral assumptions. The literature is divided into two general approaches, and we organize the survey around them. Roughly speaking, the first approach emphasizes the effect of investor behavior that is less than fully rational, and the second considers managerial behavior that is less than fully rational. For each line of research, we review the basic theoretical frameworks, the main empirical challenges, and the empirical evidence. Of course, in practice, both channels of irrationality may operate at the same time; our taxonomy is meant to fit the existing literature, but it does suggest some structure for how one might, in the future, go about combining the two approaches.

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